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STATE REGULATION OF POWER PLANT SITING
Americans do not seem to be willing to let the utilities continue
devouring these ever increasing quantities of water, air and land.
And yet they also are not willing to contemplate doing without
all the electricity they want.'
This conflict between the demands for environmental protection and
available energy2 is most acute in the development of power facility sites.
Primarily because of the high visibility of the electric power industry's
facilities and environmental impact, the siting of power plants has become
a controversial issue.' Having recognized that the electric power industry
is a major polluter, the public will no longer permit additional energy
demands to be met without prior consideration of the harmful effects of
such resource utilization. In the recent past, however, this new-found
environmental concern has often ignored the nation's accelerating needs
for additional energy.4 Recent examples of power shortages caused by
the delays inherent in private environmental litigation also indicate the
inappropriateness of focusing only on environmental considerations.
Fortunately, the incompatibility between the increasing need for electric
power and the need to protect the environment is not absolute. Accommodations can be made which coordinate these objectives.
Private litigation based on nuisance law has failed to provide adequate environmental protection.' A plaintiff seeking such relief against
environmental abuse must bear a very substantial and difficult burden
of proof.' Furthermore, the case-by-case nature of private litigation pre1. Main, A Peak Load of Trouble for the Utilities, FORTUNE, Nov., 1969, at 205.
2. Between now and 2001, the U.S. will consume more energy than it has before
in its entire history. And by 2001, the annual demand is expected to double, while the
annual worldwide demand is to triple. Starr, Energy and Power, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,

Sept., 1971, at 37.
3. Hearings on Powerplant Siting & Environmental Protection Before the Subcomm. on Communications & Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 237 (1971) (remarks of Sec'y of Interior Rogers
C.B. Morton) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
4. Warning signals are readily discernible. For example, in New York City, for
four days in the summer of 1969, Consolidated Edison asked the public to conserve electricity. Low generating resources had resulted from a delay in completion of a new
power project; the delay had been caused by a lawsuit brought by environmentalists.
Luce, Power for Tomorrow: The Siting Dilemma, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 13 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Luce].
5. H. Green, The Role of Government in Environmental Conflict, at 2, Sept. 11-12,
1969 (paper delivered before Conference on Law and the Environment, Warrenton, Va.)
[hereinafter cited as Green].
6. The plaintiff must first prove that the defendant has engaged in activities which

NATURAL GAS
vents the development of overall policies. Finally, the low rate of plaintiff
success, along with the expense involved in such litigation, deters most
members of the public from initiating private action.7
The failure of private litigation, reinforced by the results of comprehensive studies undertaken to ascertain how these conflicts can be met,
indicates that the state legislatures must take the initiative in environmental defense.' This necessity for state action is the cornerstone of
recently proposed federal legislation concerning power plant siting.9 The
legislation would provide an overall framework under which state governments could form regulatory certifying agencies. Such proposals reflect
a belief that states are best suited to decide where power plants should be
sited and emphasize the affirmative role that state governments must
assume.
The appropriateness of state control is reinforced by the fact that
states have the authority and ability to take affirmative steps in delineating standards and implementing a policy of public protection. The ability
of the state to act for the protection of the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens has traditionally been acknowledged as within the state's police
power."0 State governments concentrate on a smaller group of constihave resulted or will result in irreparable injury to him. Once legally cognizable injury
is shown, the plaintiff must still establish a causal relationship between the injury and
the defendant's act. Moreover, even if injury and a causal link can be demonstrated,
more may be necessary, because our legal system hesitates to stultify socially useful
activities unless their adverse consequences on the public clearly outweigh their social
utility. Id. at 1-2.
7. Moreover, the members of the public who appeal to the court for protection
generally do not represent important economic interests, and the alleged injuries on
which their claims rest are usually vague and speculative. Those who disturb the environment (e.g., power companies), however, tend to have immediate and obvious economic interests and are engaged in socially useful endeavors. Id. at 7. See Kaufman,
Power for the People--and by the People: Utilities, the Environment and the Public
Interest, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 867 (1971).
8. Dr. Gordon J.F. MacDonald, testifying at hearings on proposed national legislation on power plant siting, commented on the need for state action in this area. He
noted that states have the necessary constitutional authority in regard to land use decisions; they are responsible for enforcing environmental quality standards for air and
water; they have various regulatory powers over public utilities. Moreover, the state
governments are close enough to those affected to be responsive, yet removed enough to
insure that local demands will not overrule broader public interests. 1971 Hearings, supra note 3, at 299.
Unfortunately, however, with few exceptions, the states have not yet exercised the
necessary leadership. Efforts to appease a diverse electorate result in compromise rather
than in an integrated plan for action. Since the utilities are well financed and constitute an effective lobby, legislators and executives tend to pay heed to their arguments
rather than to those ill-defined and speculative allegations presented by private individuals or groups who argue for environmental legislation. Green, supra note 5, at 7.
9. H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
10. See Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887). It is worth noting that in enacting 1967 and 1970 federal air pollution control
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tuents. Presumably this makes them more sensitive to public needs and,
therefore, better able to formulate successful environmental policies.
Unfortunately, most current state regulation of power plant siting
has proved ineffective. While recognizing that the licensing procedure is
the key to effective regulation, most state legislation is deficient because
it attempts to utilize existing agencies without providing for their proper
interrelation. The states have typically failed to recognize the one basic
requirement for effective licensing control-licensing must be administered and coordinated by one central certifying body, well in advance of any
construction. Continued state reliance on the separate, uncoordinated
licensing procedures of existing agencies, whereby separate licenses must
be obtained for specific phases of development, can only allow fragmented
review. Such a system cannot effectively assess the overall problems of
plant siting. Thus, agencies often approve licenses or permits without
understanding the dimensions of the problems before them and without
giving regard to the total environmental threat presented by plant installation.1 Attempts at regulation in New York and Connecticut reflect
the deficiencies common in many states.
NEW YORK AND CONNECTICUT

Having recognized that a basic method of controlling power plant
siting is the requirement of state approval before the start of plant construction, New York has provided that no gas or electric utility may
begin construction of a power plant without first obtaining approval
from the Public Service Commission." That approval is to be based
upon public necessity and convenience, as well as economic and engineering feasibility. Unfortunately, consideration of environmental factors
has been precluded by legislative construction of the "public necessity and
convenience" clause as only applicable in determining which of two or
more utilities should be permitted to operate in a given area." Furthermore, once a certificate of approval has been issued, a utility company may
build new plants in the certified area without further approval from the
legislation, for example, Congress indicated its desire not to displace this state power
but, wherever possible, to leave the primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing
standards in the states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-2(a), -5, -6(c), -7(d), -9(b), d-1

(1970).
11.

1971 Hearings,supra note 3, at 302. Industry is also concerned about the multiplicity of regulatory bodies. Power companies realize that indecision by any one of
the agencies can lead to major construction and operating delays.
12. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 68 (McKinney 1955).
13. NEW ENGLAND RIVER BASINS COMM'N, LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF POWER

PLANT SITING IN NEW ENGLAND 8 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as POWER PLANT SITING].
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Commission."4 While a legislative scheme requiring prior approval theoretically may provide an affective means of regulation, a restrictive construction such as New York's renders this regulatory opportunity almost
meaningless.
Regulation of financing arrangements is an additional method by
which control over power plant installation can be asserted. Because of
the enormous expense involved in construction, a power company is
generally permitted to issue stock or borrow money to finance its plans.
In New York such financing arrangements must first be approved by the
Public Utility Commission. The power to refuse such approval would
seem to provide the Commission with a means of achieving sound environmental control in power plant siting. However, where the Commission
controls only long-term financing, as in New York, this power can easily
be circumvented. Since the use of short-term financing need not be approved by the Commission, utilities can often complete construction,
present the Commission with a fait accompli and then seek permission
to issue stocks or bonds in order to repay the short-term loans.1" Such a
request can hardly be refused. In this manner, the state can be deprived
of another mode of controlling the development of plant sites.'"
Plant siting can also be controlled by land use regulation. In many
states, however, the initial siting decision rests with local zoning authorities, thereby precluding the state from passing upon the merits of the site
location. Former Connecticut law limited the state Public Utilities Commission to appellate review of initial siting decisions." Consequently, if
the land was not zoned or if there was no appeal from the zoning board's
initial decision, the Commission was precluded from participation in
plant siting determinations. Such local control over plant installation
14. Id.
15. Id. at 10.
16. By enacting Pub. Act No. 575 [CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., Supp. No. 4 (1971)1,
Connecticut has sought to prevent utilities from circumventing regulation by this means.
Section 5(a) states:
No person shall acquire real property in contemplation of, . . . commence the
preparation of the site for, or commence the construction or supplying of a facility . . . that may . . . have a substantial adverse environmental effect . . .
without having first obtained a certificate of environmental compatability and
public need ...
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-235 (Supp. 1971). The Connecticut approach
discussed in this section was that in effect before passage of the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, which became effective, for the most part, on July 1, 1971. Pub.
Act No. 575 [CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., Supp. No. 4 (1971)]. The new legislation has
corrected many of the deficiencies present under the old plan, but discussion of the latter
is, nevertheless, appropriate because the problems faced by Connecticut in developing a
good system are fairly typical, so that other states might well profit from Connecticut's
experience.
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prevents both the formulation of long-range planning guidelines for
power expansion and the sophisticated assessment of a plant's environmental impact in a specific area. Realizing that municipal zoning boards
generally lack the expertise, knowledge and desire required for sound
development of plant siting, Connecticut has since established an independent agency capable of making informed site certification decisions."
A state can also effectively control power plant siting by the imposition of water quality control standards as a part of its licensing procedure. " Connecticut has established a special Water Resources Commission"0 which must issue a permit before refuse can be discharged into
state waters. If the Commission finds that a proposed discharge would
pollute the waters, the permit will be denied until plans for effective treatment are submitted. 1 The Commission is also empowered to undertake
periodic inspections of existing plant operations. If a substantial change
in the manner, nature or volume of the discharge adversely affects water
quality, the Commission can revoke the permit until the offender complies with environmental standards.22 A similar Water Resources Commission has been established in New York.2" However, Connecticut and
New York only require that a permit be obtained prior to actual discharge. 4 Consequently, utilities can construct the plants prior to applica18. Pub. Act No. 575, § 4 [CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., Supp. No. 4 (1971)] creates
the Power Facility Evaluation Council. Section 12 specifically provides that local government units cannot intrude on the jurisdiction of this agency or on that of the state
Public Utilities Commission.
19. Thermal power plants are necessarily located near large quantities of water,
because plant designs frequently call for the construction of cooling water intakes or
outfalls in public waters. Power companies may even need to build support structures
in waters for overhead transmission lines traversing the water body. Naturally, a significant effect on siting decision can be achieved by public control of this construction.
POWER PLANT SITING, supra note 13, at 23. For a detailed discussion of the environmental problems arising from thermal power facilities, see Comment, Thermal Electric
Power and Water Pollution: A Siting Approach, 46 IND. L.J. 61 (1970).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-5 4 (a)-(c) (Supp. 1971).
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54 i (c) (Supp. 1971).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54 j (Supp. 1971). The Commission also has
power and discretion to advise and consult with governmental agencies of other states
and with affected groups and industries within Connecticut in furtherance of the Act.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 47a, § 25-54c (c) (Supp. 1971). The recently enacted Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, Pub. Act No. 575 [CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.,
Supp. No. 4 (1971)], does not seem to neutralize any of the powers of the Commission.
The Commission's expertise could now be used at an earlier stage in the license proceeding (prior to construction) within the framework laid down by the new legislation.
However, the extent of participation is still unclear.
23. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 1210 (McKinney 1971).
24. A 1969 amendment to the New York law requires that a permit for thermal
discharge be obtained before construction begins. However, the enactment concerns only
nuclear power plants. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1140 (McKinney 1971).
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tion. Again, the Board will be hesitant to refuse a license to an applicant
whose plant is financed, completed and ready for operation.
One final way to control the location of power plants burning coal
and oil is by air pollution regulations. This method has been utilized in
New York and Connecticut, where Air Pollution Boards are authorized
to promulgate appropriate emission standards. 5 Nevertheless, there is
no requirement in either state that a permit be obtained prior to construction. In New York a producer can design a plant which in his own judgment (not necessarily that of an objective regulatory agency), complies
with the standards recommended by the Air Pollution Board,26 while in
Connecticut a permit must only be obtained before any new emissions.

7

It is apparent that these attempts at regulation suffer from a common
defect: isolated aspects of the siting problem are delegated to various
agencies without providing a statutory framework for their interrelation.
These schemes prevent long-range planning and overall policy making.
Furthermore, the existence of various decision making bodies results in
unwarranted delay because each individual decision is subject to challenge. Finally, such regulation is simply ineffective, for numerous loopholes allow construction to begin before the utility need apply for approval.
State legislatures possess inadequate scientific knowledge and technological sophistication to make significant judgments on pollution control." Therefore, state regulation of power plant siting must be delegated
to administrative agencies better able to understand and give expert attention to plant siting problems. In this vein, it has been suggested that
state legislation of power plant siting must contain three broad provisions.
First, it must provide for both long-range planning and public availability
of planning data. Second, such legislation must require early indentification of power plant sites and public hearings to discuss their environmental suitability."0 Third, and most important, the ability to coordinate
the engineering, economic and environmental concerns involved in the
final licensing of power projects must be combined in one state agency."
Basically, a state must require licensing, administered and coordinated by one central certifying body, before construction begins on power
plant facilities and transmission lines. This agency, after considering all
25. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1264 (McKinney 1971); CONN.
19-506 (1969).
26. POWER PLANT SITING, supra note 13, at 32.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-508d (1969).
28. 1971 HEARINGS, supra note 3, at 302.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Luce, supra note 4, at 23.

GEN. STAT. ANN.
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environmentally related facts and appropriate advisory recommendations,
would grant or deny the construction license. Thus, only one decision
would be reviewable-the grant or denial of the license. 2 This procedure
would permit questions of energy needs, land degradation, air and water
pollution and other environmental problems to be fully discussed and resolved prior to the time when the energy needs of the community become
so acute that immediate action is required regardless of its environmental
impact.
Agencies dealing with the problems of power plant siting are faced
with social, economic, scientific and technological questions. Since power
plant installations affect the total environment, action to control one type
of pollution may influence another. Therefore, compliance with one
agency's standards may result in violation of those of another agency.
Numerous uncoordinated license proceedings, presided over by several
independent and autonomous agencies, -prohibit a state from dealing adequately with the serious ecological problems inherent in power plant
siting.
Effective long-range planning of power needs and facilities requires
expanded research and development efforts." One agency alone is incapable of deciding these multidimensional questions. A state air pollution
control board, for example, cannot comprehend the total environmental
threat posed by a new power plant. Nevertheless, this board is still the
most qualified agency to deal with the threat of environmental abuse
posed by air emissions. Having several state agencies involved in the
licensing process thus becomes imperative.
To assure successful planning, there must be cooperation and interrelation between the various agencies involved in environmental control,
so that they can share their knowledge with each other. Agency guidelines and functions must be clearly defined and coordinated to insure
32. New York's procedure for determining all siting questions involving major
(NEw
utility transmission facilities protects against excessive judicial interference.
YORK PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 120-30, McKinney Supp. 1971). Recognizing the grave consequences of delay caused by litigation, the procedure is designed to be in the nature of
an in rem proceeding. All interests are given an opportunity to litigate their rights with
respect to all aspects of the project in a single proceeding before the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court. See Stone, Power Siting: A Challenge to the Legal Process, 36
By providing for initial review at a level above the trial
ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1971).
court, New York seems to recognize that actions involving power facilities rarely terminate at the trial court. Id. at 12. Nevertheless, the statute applies only to transmission facility siting. The location of power plants in New York, as in other states, continues to be a process in which proposed construction is frequently held in abeyance indefinitely as a result of legal action.
33. Seder, Regulatory Activism-The Aftermath of Scenic Hudson, 1969 ABA
PUB. UTIL. LAW SECTION 3.
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proper responsibility in siting decisions. Before power plant construction
can begin, a "panel of interested local and state agencies which by the
nature of their jurisdiction have a substantial interest in the outcome of
the licensing procedure" 4 should advise the final license-granting body.
Such a systematic process, wherein the contributions of participating
agencies are synthesized by one central body in reaching a "final" decision,
is imperative if states are to meet the challenge posed by plant siting.
Centralized licensing at the preconstruction stage is the major means by
which effective regulation can be established. Fragmented agency action
leads to unplanned growth and piecemeal destruction of the environment. Fortunately, legislation recently enacted in several states indicates
that a solution is possible. 5
MARYLAND AND

WASHINGTON-A

BETTER WAY

The states of Washington and Maryland have recently enacted new
planning and coordinating mechanisms for the siting of power plants. 6
In both states administrative agencies are now charged with the responsibility for establishing and enforcing environmental standards. Furthermore, official state policy requires all affected agencies to recognize
environmental quality while considering power needs. Although Washington and Maryland have failed to legislate the clear guidelines necessary
for effective long-range planning and adequate notice of decisional
criteria, they have enacted enabling legislation which allows the appropriate agencies to formulate such standards."
One major cause of ineffective regulation of power plant siting has
been insufficient scientific and engineering understanding on the part of
agencies involved in the licensing procedure. 8 However, the need for
34. Luce, supra note 4, at 22-23. This technique has been referred to as the "consultative process." It is an outgrowth of reality because when dealing with complex
problems, whose solutions are not easily ascertainable, agencies must carry on an
interchange.
Since agencies live by reason, they must constantly seek understanding; this
need leads them to consultation. Moreover they must see to it that the public
interest is not only accurately assessed, but also that it is understood by those
who will implement the . . . program.

Carlson, Consultative Law: An Emerging Legal Development, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1496,
1502 (1968).
35. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-360 et seq. (Supp. 1971) ; ORE. LAWS ch. 609
(1971).
36. WASIJ. REv. CODE § 80.50.010 et seq. (1971) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 43, § 706, art.
66C, §§ 5A, 726, 763-68, art. 78, §§ 54A, 54B, 90, art. 96A, § 11 (ch. 31, [1971] Laws
of Md.).
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 80.50.040(1) (1970) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 1 (Supp.
1969).
38. Many environmental agencies seem to suffer from this problem, whether at
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research in the field of environmental protection has been recognized by
the state of Washington. Its Thermal Power Plant Site Evaluation
Council has the power to make and contract for independent studies of
proposed thermal power plant sites and transmission line routes."9 Similarly, Maryland has established a complex Environmental Trust Fund
which will be used to finance such research.4
Maryland has also recognized the need for interagency cooperation.
Maryland law provides that the Secretaries of Natural Resources, Health
and Mental Hygiene and Economic and Community Development work
together with electric company representatives to implement a continuing
research program for electric power plant site evaluations. 4 ' These representatives cooperate with the state Public Service Commission which,
in turn, is responsible for assembling and evaluating annually the longrange plans of Maryland's public electric companies. Washington also
officially endorses the need for interagency consultation, and its Thermal
Power Plant Site Evaluation Council consists of directors and administrators from several departments, agencies and commissions.42
This type of legislation clearly broadens the administrative process
and, by coordinating knowledge about a power plant site proposal, encourages effective siting control. By this cooperation, the complex nature
of the licensing process can be appreciated. Furthermore, a mechanism
is provided for identifying in advance both long-range goals and potential
problem areas.4
Washington's licensing procedure calls for "a binding agreement
between an applicant and the state which shall embody compliance to the
siting guidelines" adopted by the Thermal Power Plant Site Evaluation
Council." These guidelines must be met "prior to or concurrent with
the construction or operation of any thermal power plant" within the
state.4" The Council, after extensive investigation and consultation with
local, state or federal level. The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, was
initially directed toward lawyer-directed regulation and control and was most eager to
make an initial impression upon industry and the public. Unfortunately, it seems the
agency may not, in many cases, have the necessary scientific and technological support
to make its directives stick.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.040(8) (1970).
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 763 (cs. 31, § 1, [1971] Laws of Md.).
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 764 (ch. 31, § 1, [1971] Laws of Md.).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.030(3) (1970).
43. The end result of this cooperation could be a requirement that utilities locate
facilities in protected sites designated by the state, unless they can show affirmatively
that their proposed site possesses superior environmental qualifications. Ross, Power and
the Environment: A Statutory Approach to Electric Facility Siting, 47 WASH. L. REV.
35, 59 (1971).
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 80.50.020(6) (1970).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.020(6) (1970).
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other state environmental agencies, reports its recommended disposition
of an application to the Governor, who makes the final decision."6
Maryland law requires that a power company apply to the state
Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity prior to construction. Upon receipt of an application, the Commission notifies the Departments of Natural Resources and Water Resources, which then investigate the proposed plant site., The results of
these studies, together with a recommendation that the certificate be
granted, denied or granted with conditions, are then returned to the
Commission. Following a public hearing on these recommendations,
the Chairman of the Commission makes a final decision."
Despite the importance of coordinated and systematic review of plant
design and location by a single regulatory agency, the Washington and
Maryland laws are unclear as to the scope of authority and method of
operation of the central agency. One commentator believes that the Washington legislation"s in effect provided that the Council's authority supersedes that of all other licensing agencies, thereby allowing that body to
grant permits over their objections. 9 However, to foreclose this possibility the Council itself has adopted specific regulations requiring an
applicant to:
submit plans relating to the satisfaction of existing statutory
criteria, requirements, standards and regulations of those state
agencies which, prior to certification, have any legal authority
over conditions or activites related to the site."
While this final version retreated somewhat from an earlier proposal
requiring utilities to "submit evidence of satisfying existing statutory
Allowing the Governor to make the fi46. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.100 (1970).
nal determination appears to be a major deficiency in the Washington law. After an
extensive scientific and legal evaluation of the proposed site by experts, the chief political officer of the state makes the final decision.
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 5A (ch. 31, § 1, [1971] Laws of Md.). This is the
general procedure. For plants producing more than 69,000 volts of power, the application must be submitted at least two years in advance. The procedure followed in this
case differs slightly. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§ 54A, 54B (ch. 31, § 1, [1971] Laws of

Md.).
[C]ertification . . . shall bind the state or any of its departments,
. . . subject only to the conditions set forth in such certification.
The issuance of a certification shall be in lieu of any permit, certificate or
similar document required by any department, agency, division, bureau, commission or board of this state.
WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.120 (1970).
49. Rodgers, Siting Power Plants in Washington State, 47 WASH. L. REv. 9, 21
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Rodgers].
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 463-12-010 (5) (1970).
48.
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criteria . . . of those state agencies having any legal authority""1 over
plant siting, it is a step in the right direction. It seems imperative that the
central agency embrace and enhance the pollution control functions performed by existing agencies rather than ignoring or emasculating them."
The powers of the various existing agencies need not, and should not
be curtailed. The Washington Council and the Maryland Commission
should function as coordinating mechanisms, while other agencies retain
and exercise their statutory powers. Both states have recently enacted
legislation allowing the conditions prescribed by the individual agencies
to be incorporated into the site certification agreement. If a state agency
could previously unilaterally veto a proposed site under its jurisdiction,
it should still be able to do so within the broader framework provided
by the central body. That body, in turn, should try to resolve conflicting
opinions. "Through its broad representation from among the spectrum
of state interest, [it] is designed to be a unifying forum where parochial
department interests must be evaluated against the composite needs of the
state."5
No utility company should unilaterally decide what is best for the
public. Unilateral decision making has only succeeded in creating public
resistance, conflict, delay and unnecessary expense. Agencies must, therefore, give increased attention to citizen involvement so that the public
may "inform the agency and presumably assist it in reaching a decision
which will further the public interest or accommodate the public convenience and necessity." 4 Washington legislation affords an opportunity
for public participation in planning and site approval by providing that the
Plant Evaluation Council hold a public hearing in the county of the proposed site within sixty days of receipt of an application for site certification.55 If necessary, additional public hearings may be held." Furthermore,
after the Council receives a site application, the attorney general must
51. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 463-12-010 (5) (Proposed Reg., Mar. 23, 1970) (on
file with Washington State Thermal Power Plant Siting Council, Olympia, Wash.).
52. Maryland law is also deficient in this respect. It implies that the Public Service
Commission can make its own recommendations even if they conflict with the findings
of other regulatory agencies. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 5A (ch. 31, § 1, [19711 Laws
of Md.).
53. Rodgers, supra note 49, at 24.
54. Hanes, Citizen Participationand Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administrative Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731, 736 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hanes].
55. WASH. REV. COnE § 80.50.090(1) (1970) ; cf. Pub. Act No. 575, § 7(a) [CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN., Supp. No. 4 (1971)] (hearing required between thirty and 180 days
after application). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54A (ch. 31, § 1 [1971] Laws of
Md. 96) (joint hearing with local governing bodies).
56. WASH. Rav. CODE § 80.50.090 (4) (1970).
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appoint an attorney to "represent the public and its interest in protecting
the quality of the environment.""7
By enabling public groups as well as relevant state agencies to take
part in the initial plant siting decision, flexible communication channels,
important in resolving plant siting problems, can be maintained. However, while citizen participation can inform agencies, the ultimate responsibility for protecting the public interest and the environment rests
with the administrators. 8
Finally, a proper licensing procedure must insure expeditious judicial
review of state licensing decisions. Both Maryland and Washington have
recognized that mere consolidation of reviewing authority in one agency
does not obviate the necessity for supplemental judicial review. 9 While
courts should not "interfere with agency discretion in applying a particular
standard, . . . they can and must decide if the proper standard is being
used.""0 Courts should, therefore, have knowledge of the decisional criteria
imposed by the certifying agency. To be effective, however, such review
must take place before site preparation is commenced."'
CONCLUSION

Any apparent incompatibility between the protection of the environment and the production of electricity is not absolute. "Accommodations
can be made which recognize the validity of both social objectives." 2 The
state administrative process, if properly organized and defined, is capable
of reacting to new and complex problems. The state licensing procedure,
in particular, has great potential for both regulating the power industry
and controlling the siting of future power installations.
It can be argued that such stringent environmental standards as
imposed by a unified state licensing procedure pose additional hurdles for
developers and will deter them from constructing the facilities necessary
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.080
GEN. STAT. ANN., Supp. No. 4 (1971)]

(1970); cf. Pub. Act No. 575, § 8(b) [CONN.
(attorney appointed as counsel for the Council).

58. Hanes, supra note 54, at 739.
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 767 (ch. 31, § 1, [1971] Laws of Md.) ; WASH. REV.
CODE § 80.50.140 (1970).
60. Note, Administrative Agencies, the Public Interest, and National Policy: Is a
Marriage Possible?, 59 GEO. L.J. 420, 425 (1970).
61. Prof. Joseph L. Sax thinks the principal role of the courts in the licensing
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to supply increasing demands. Perhaps the better argument is that tightening pollution control regulations will induce the power industry to minimize the harmful effects of its plants and, thereby, to protect the environment.
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